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CURRENCY EOUIVALENTS
Currency Unit Won (W)
US$1.00 W700 (as of November, 1988)
US$1.00 W780 (as of May 1993)
FISCAL YEAR
January 1 - December 31
MEASURES AND EQUIVALENTS
Metric System
ABBREVIATIONS
BPR - Bureau of Public Roads
MOF - Ministry of Finance
MOC - Ministry of Construction
MOHA - Ministry of Home Affairs
RMMS - Road Maintenance Management
System
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MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Korea
Road Improvement Project (Loan 3061-KO)
Attached is the Project Completion Report (PCR) on the Korea: Road Improvement project (Loan
3061-KO, approved in FY89), prepared by the East Asia and Pacific Regional Office with Part II
contributed by the Borrower. The Loan for US$177.21 million equivalent was approved on May 16, 1989
and closed on December 31, 1993, at the date planned. Due to lower than expected costs, US$22.9 million
of the loan was canceled.
The loan was the seventh by the Bank to support the road system in Korea. The objectives were (a)
to enhance transport efficiency by upgrading the surface and alignment of existing roads and by improving
maintenance operations and management; (b) to expand traffic capacity by widening roads in corridors
with high transport demand; and (c) to increase traffic safety through a number of measures: better design
and design standards, new infrastructure work in hazardous locations, intersection improvements,
improvements in traffic safety practices through the development of safety manuals, etc. The project also
included land acquisition, consultant services for construction supervision, and acquisition of equipment for
road maintenance. These were relevant but relatively modest objectives in view of Korea's stage of
development.
The PCR gives an adequate account of project execution. There is, however, no information on
supervision. This is an important omission because the Borrower did successfully manage resettlement and
land acquisition in spite of an unexpected large increase in land prices and some resident opposition to land
acquisition, including litigation in the courts by some residents. The Borrower managed the land
acquisition successfully and, apparently, without lasting social harm. The factors that contributed to
management success are of general interest to the Bank and should have been investigated or reported.
Although the appraisal dismissed the possible implementation delays and cost increases due to land
acquisition because project components were located in suburban and rural areas, the Borrower, and
especially, the implementing agency, had the skill to marshal the counterpart funds, mobilize staff, and
utilize available legal processes to resolve the problem in a timely fashion.
The increased resettlement costs were largely offset by lower than estimated contracting costs.
Higher than anticipated traffic volumes made the project's economic rate of return higher, from the
estimated 27 percent to 30 percent. The outcome is rated as satisfactory, its sustainability as likely, and its
impact on institutional development as modest.
No audit is plained.
Attachment
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents
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Preface
This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Road Improvement Project, for which
Loan 3061-KO was approved on May 16, 1989 in the amount of US$200 million. US$15 million was
canceled on January 28, 1993, and US$7.79 million was canceled at the time of loan account closing on
February 14, 1994.
The PCR was prepared by the Infrastructure Operations Division, Country Department I,
East Asia and Pacific Region, as the last Bank Supervision Mission was carried out in April, 1993. The
PCR's findings are based on a review of the documents in the project files at the World Bank and data
provided by the Borrower.
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Evaluation Summarv
Background and Objective
1. Since 1971, the Bank has supported the Government's initiatives in the highway subsector
with financial and technical assistance through completion of seven highway and expressway projects.
The Road Improvement Project was the sixth highway sector loan the Bank made, and was intended to
support the Government's Sixth Plan (1987-91). The Bank has been involved in the development of the
highway sector since the Government's Second Plan. Loan 3061-KO was signed on November 15, 1989;
was effective on February 6, 1990; and closed on December 31, 1993. The executing agency was the
Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) of the Ministry of Construction (MOC).
2. The project was designed to support the Government's Sixth Plan, to complete some
initiatives begun under previous Bank-assisted projects and to help to increase transport capacity during
the Sixth Plan period (1987-91) by supporting three principal road-related Government objectives: (a)
enhancing transport efficiency by upgrading the surface and alignment of existing roads and by improving
road maintenance and operations; (b) expanding traffic capacity by widening roads in corridors with high
transport demand; and (c) increasing traffic safety through a number of measures, including safety-
conscious design of project facilities, modification of design standards and practices, where appropriate,
and physical improvement of known hazardous road locations.
3. The major components of the project were:
(a) paving, upgrading and widening of about 270 km of the national road system;
(b) establishment of a new Road Maintenance Management System (RMMS), including
periodic maintenance and rehabilitation of about 700 km of paved national roads;
(c) implementation of selected aspects of the national road safety program, including safety-
conscious road design, a hazardous location improvement program and preparation of road
safety guidelines; and
(d) the provision of equipment, consultants' services, and training for road sector development.
4. The project was comprised of timely and well justified components and while it focused
largely on physical aspects, it also included institutional strengthening in maintenance management and
road safety, which were intended to complete some initiatives begun under previous Bank-assisted
projects. All of these components were well designed to support Sixth Plan objectives.
5. The project was based on a clear conceptual understanding of the requirements by all
parties and was well designed by the Borrower and the Bank. While not overly ambitious in terms of
focusing on institutional strengthening components like environment and resettlement, which were already
of great concern to the Bank at the time of appraisal in 1988, the scope and scale of the project were
